My main area of interest is the philosophy of science with an emphasis in feminist philosophy of biology. I have also done some work in experimental philosophy. My PhD dissertation looks at a new branch of evolutionary psychology called “feminist evolutionary psychology.” I am interested in, descriptively, what the feminist projects of this discipline are, and prescriptively, their strengths and weakness. I am also interested in how successful feminist evolutionary psychology methods and theory are for studying human evolution.

A central theme in my research focuses on the appropriate, effective use and development of philosophical methodology. In the two select contributions below, I and my co-authors demonstrate the relevance and importance of using feminist and empirical methods, respectively, for philosophical analytical research. My research is supported by a SSHRC Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canadian Graduate Scholarship.

Select Contributions

Weaver, S. and Fehr, C. (in press) “Values, practices, and metaphysical assumptions in the biological sciences” in Ann Garry, Alison Stone, and Serene Khader (eds) The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy.

The biological sciences provide ample opportunity and motivation for feminist interventions. These sciences are seen by many as an authority on human nature and are highly relevant to many issues of social justice and public policy. Feminist philosophy of biology focuses on the ethical and epistemic adequacy and responsibility of biological claims. This work is critical in the sense of identifying epistemically and ethically irresponsible knowledge claims, research practices, and dissemination of biological research regarding sex/gender, including ways that sex/gender interacts with other social categories. In this chapter we describe classic themes in feminist philosophy of biology, with particular regard to research practices and metaphysical assumptions. We then go on to argue that these classic themes remain salient in contemporary neuroscientific investigations of human emotion and in feminist research on the evolution of human behavior.

Weaver, S. and Turri, J. (in press) “Persisting as many,” in Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe (eds) Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy.

Many philosophers hypothesize that our concept of personal identity is partly constituted by the one-person-one-place rule, which states that a person can only be in only one place at a time. This hypothesis has been assumed by the most influential contemporary work on personal identity. In this paper, we report a series of studies testing whether the hypothesis is true. In these studies, people consistently judged that the same person existed in two different places at the same time. This result undermines some influential widely held philosophical assumptions, supports others, and fits well with recent discoveries on identity judgments about inanimate objects and non-human animals.

 

For a link to my CV, please click here